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BOOK REVIEW
By Monroe H. Freedman.,
Indianapolis, Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1975. Pp. 267.
$12.50.
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM.

2
Reviewed by Robert H. Kennedy

Parts of this book have already appeared in law reviews and
journals-and consequently can be assumed to have been largely unread. Publication in book form is therefore most welcome despite
some deceptive packaging (half the book is devoted to a reprint
of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility). Dean Freedman
will not comfort law students looking for answers, but he will intrigue
those who seek proper questions. Nor will he satisfy anyone looking
for another high-pitched diatribe aimed at the profession. This book
is neither denunciatory nor really prescriptive; rather it is a thoughtfully constructed call for a more realistic examination of the standards
by which the bar claims to govern itself.
That the Code of Professional Responsibility is a self-contradictory
and deficient instrument is a commonplace. Why it remains so sluggishly unresponsive to the needs of the bar and society is less obvious.
Professor Freedman argues that the irrelevancies of the Code stem
from the bar's historic inability or unwillingness to perceive what
lawyers really do, and to correlate those findings with the social and
political interests the profession is intended to serve. His technique is
to put the reader in the shoes of a lawyer faced with a wrenchingly
concrete ethical problem and to illuminate how little help is available
from the undifferentiated and often contradictory abstractions of the
Code.
Professor Freedman has tried lawsuits. Despite his present academic
role, his credentials as a "real" lawyer are ample, and his perceptions
and descriptions of the paradoxes of lawyering are invaluable. The
major thrust of the book is that any analysis of legal ethics must be
bottomed upon an awareness of the practical context in which lawyers
live. With this in mind, Freedman proceeds to consider how the ethical
confrontations of the profession remain unresolved through any literal
application of the conflicting generalities of the Code. Lawyers, to be
responsive to their varied obligations, are presented with difficult
Hobson's choices. Freedman gives us several examples, and the
examples are not forced; nor can they be attributed to the changing
relationships with which the bar has lately been faced. While it has
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been only 5 years since the Code of Professional Responsibility was
proposed and adopted by the American Bar Association, the points
Dean Freedman makes in this volume are equally as valid if aimed
at the prior Canons of Ethics. The criticisms are not directed at any
failure of the bar to understand new relationships, but rather at
years of abstract and often flaccid analysis of what lawyers actually do,
and have been doing, since time out of mind.
The new Code was developed by no doubt distinguished counsel
in response to a long-felt belief that further patching of the old
Canons of Ethics risked turning an historic legacy into an evident
anachronism. A complete rewrite was undertaken-and it is a rewrite
that emerged. Changes in form and style are far more obvious than
is new analysis. If one knew what a good, internally consistent, and
relevant Code would look like, one could say perhaps that this one is
only ceremonial or truly bad. Professor Freedman's point is that we
don't know how to go about constructing a good set of rules to govern
ourselves because we have never undertaken a realistic analysis of
what we do.
An example of the author's technique can be drawn from his
chapter with the highly charged title, "Access to the Legal System:
The Professional Responsibility to Chase Ambulances." "Ambulance
chasing," like "splitting fees" and "solicitation," is imbued with emotional content; the words allegedly identify an officially condemned
practice. Freedman would have us ask, "Why condemned?" in light of
the equally important but possibly contrary affirmative obligations of
a lawyer to make legal services available. What does the condemnation
of "chasing" and "solicitation" actually mean in light of the more
systemic societal obligation to make legal services available to the
public? Consider the obligations of strict candor and of strict confidentiality. Should a lawyer, for example, betray a client's confidences
or preserve them by participating in a deception of the court, where
those are his only real choices?
To return to "ambulance chasing," Canon Two of the Code provides that "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling
Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." Freedman convincingly
argues (though from a poorly selected example) that if lawyers don't
chase clients, many people with recognized legal rights will not be
advised or assisted at all-or not until their rights are diminished or
lost. As keepers of a mystery, lawyers take as a first principle that they
alone are able and authorized to determine the existence of legal
rights. Condemnation of "the unauthorized practice of law" is supported by that principle and helps assure control. Yet through prohibitions
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of "solicitation" and "advertising," the bar requires prospective clients
somehow to determine, without a lawyer, when they need one and how
to find a competent one without assistance. The person who is therefore, by definition,8 ignorant of the basic existence and scope of his
legal rights is engineered into being lulled or misled-often to his
permanent loss. Dean Freedman asks how those circumstances comport
with an obligation to make legal services available to the public.
A comparable example, not addressed by the author, is the bar's
prohibition against any division of fees except "in proportion to the
services performed and the responsibility assumed by each lawyer."
Fee splitting is known to be an obvious evil, proscribed to lawyers.
Why? Henry Drinker, the most eminent writer in this field, explains
that institution of the rule was a "distinct step in keeping the legal
profession from becoming a mere business." 4 Aside from the gratuity to
mere businessmen, what questions that kind of explanation answers are
not apparent. Ethics committees routinely repeat the phrases in rendering their opinions, but in reality, fee splitting is about as common
as it is condemned. Its persistence is arguably evidence of its necessity.5
A regular division of fees, wholly without reference to work done, or
responsibility assumed, is not an exception; it is the rule in broad areas
of negligence practice. Standard referral fees are ritualistically observed.
There is a common understanding that forwarding lawyers need neither do work nor assume any responsibility. While statistics are not available, certainly a majority of civil lawsuits filed result from a fee splitting
referral system. Is not the personal injury referral system, with its
systematic division of fees, when combined with forms of advertising,
an effective social mechanism for the public announcement that legal
rights both exist and can be enforced? Does not the mechanism, by
and large, deliver the clients to the negligence specialist? No bar association known to this writer has ever taken public advertisements to
advise the public of those rights or how to preserve them.6
3. Although the concept of "unauthorized practice" is supported in part by the belief
that only lawyers know "the law," courts also, in limited circumstances, apply the
notion that everyone is presumed to know the law.
4. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, 186 n.30 (1953).
5. A searching reanalysis is at least suggested where the conduct of a professional
group is at odds with the group's code of conduct; and where, as the ABA's Special
Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement not long ago reported, there is
a "scandalous" apathy and hostility to enforcement of the Canons.
6. It has been suggested that condemning "fee splitting" guarantees that referrals
will be based on merit rather than mere commerce. There is no good evidence of that.
How does one measure the effects of a rule not observed? In addition to merit, referrals
are influenced by old school ties, habit, and such considerations as the receiving lawyer's
cooperation in taking "dog" cases which for some reason the sending lawyer must process.
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Dean Freedman's point is that the Code is unrealistic and often
offers little practical guidance for such problems because it is an abstraction. It is not based on an analysis of what lawyers do in the
context of the society in which they function. The book serves to
illustrate the need for and the kind of analysis that might be made. The
mere presentation of some of these issues disturbs some members of
the bar; but that can be no excuse for ignoring the issues. Without an
adequate systemic analysis the profession will continue to appear to
be a "mere business"--and not a very thoughtful one at that. Without
a realistic understanding of what legal practice is and of the social
interests to be advanced or retarded by the legal system, ethics committees will continue to occupy their time with what the Secretary
of the Association of the Bar of New York has called the "etiquette
and tawdry pilfering" of a few of its members. No one ever suggests
that such committees be abandoned, but anyone who doubts that ethics
committees rarely, if ever, address serious professional conflicts must
only look at what they do. Opinions are regularly rendered to guide
the bar by a rote application of the Code's unexamined formulas. The
process is a parody of Talmudic analysis. For example, the Committee
on Professional Ethics of the Florida Bar is composed of intelligent
and thoughtful lawyers. It has "selected" and published 34 wellwritten opinions for 1974-75. Presumably, the 34 were selected from the whole for their special meaningfulness to the practicing bar. In no case is a declared proposition supported by any adequate
discussion of the interests involved, or any apparent consideration of
the manner in which those interests, once identified and once ordered,
are affected by the result announced. Consequently, like the results
of applying any magic formula, the opinions cannot be examined
except as they comport with prior opinions or may form a basis for
the next round of similar applications.
In the opinions, for example, the bar is advised of the following:
that there are geographical limits to the range of yellow page listings
a lawyer may use (the opinion enlarges upon rules rendered in several
earlier opinions on the same subject); that a lawyer may not, "however
worthy the service," form and operate an organization to locate and
serve persons eligible to receive surplus tax funds (despite the committee's acknowledgment that not unfrequently such persons will not
be reached by the statutory process); that a lawyer may not use a proFurther, as the referral fee is ultimately based on the total amount recovered by the
client, it should be to both client's and referring counsel's advantage that the matter be
handled by competent counsel. Excessive fees are separately condemned, so prevention
of that evil is not the basis for the rule.
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fessional card having a three-dimensional effect (such a card does not
comport with "dignity"); that a lawyer may use the abbreviation "Dr."
as a title, only if his name is not followed by "J.D." (the opinion
refers to five earlier opinions on the same subject); that a Spanish
speaking lawyer may not be listed in a Spanish language telephone directory (unless it is published by the telephone company); and that
the relative size of type on a judge's campaign brochure is ethically
governed. These are hardly serious problems. Perhaps ethics committees
are not an appropriate forum for discussion of the real relationship between the society and the profession; certainly if they are not, we must
stop believing that we are accomplishing with them what must be
done.
Dean Freedman encourages us to look to the existence of matters
of professional responsibility more fundamental than the trivialities
dealt with in committee opinions, and suggests one possible method to
address such matters. Where ethics committees seem merely to compare
the words of the Code to the activity under consideration and exact a
result, the author suggests study of the realities of legal representation
in a society seeking freedom and dignity for individuals. Implicit in
Freedman's presentation is the fact that the existence of any Code is
some impediment to realistic thought processes; the structure of all
language (and particularly code-like language) encourages a confusion
of ideas with things. Legal language is well-larded with concepts having
no physical analogues: Truth, Justice, Right, Duty, Responsibility.
"What is a crime?" is a different kind of question from "What is a
shoe?" While symbolic code language is useful in certain forms of
abstract discussion (for example, in speaking to bar conventions) the
usefulness of such symbols fades away in the presence of real things.
There is, in the real life of a practicing lawyer, an elusive point of discontinuity where the symbolism must be disregarded as a meaningless impediment to good judgment. Until the Code's bare abstractions
are fleshed out with constructions grounded in social reality, lawyers
will be left adrift.
An example of this kind of hypostatization can be drawn from one
of the changes in terminology effected by the Florida Bar at the time
of its adoption of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. The
ABA Code states that a lawyer may reveal the intention of his client
to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
The Florida Disciplinary Rule provides that a lawyer shall reveal that
information. Neither Code says what a "crime" is. The answer to that
question is far from obvious, even to the keepers of the dictionary.
For reporting purposes, is an intent to commit a traffic misdemeanor
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equivalent to an intent to commit murder? May a Florida lawyer
silently listen to his client's proposal to cross against the "Don't Walk"
light? Somewhere between the two "crimes" is a point of disengagement where "crime" becomes "non-crime." Rules constructed of figurative language cannot be enforced or followed except at their parameters, and lawyers live in the undifferentiated center between the
poles. Further, what change has Florida effected by imposing a mandatory duty to do that which is inherently ambiguous? What was intended by the change? Bad reasoning, or none, results from attempted application of mere code words without concrete analysis of what lawyers
do and what the society expects, or is entitled to expect, of them.
Dean Freedman tells us, "The system of professional responsibility
that I have been advancing ... attempts to deal with ethical problems
in context-that is, as part of a functional sociopolitical system concerned
with the administration of justice in a free society." (p. 46) The book
advances no "system of professional responsibility." What it does do, and
does well, is to advance the argument for a return to a kind of realistic
questioning largely ignored in the literature. It illuminates the need
for that discussion to begin to come to grips with what lawyers actually do and are supposed to do.
To lower the level of my enthusiasm, I note that Professor Freedman's book has some structural weaknesses. While Chapters 1 through
7 together with Chapter 10 make a solid 110 page unit, Chapter 8
("Certification of Trial Lawyers") is a four-page exercise illustrating
the obvious, i.e., that the responsibility for an inadequate trial bar
rests heavily upon judges who are unable to recognize or unwilling
to do anything about incompetency. Chapter 9 ("The Myth of British
Superiority") is both thin in analysis and misplaced in this volume.
If one mark of a profession is that it governs itself conscientiously
for the public good, we cannot be content with a bar that ignores the
need for, and tools of, the analysis necessary to define either the public
good or its own role as part of that public. Dean Freedman offers a
good beginning.

